A quantum key distribution scheme whose security depends on the features of pre-and post-selected quantum ensembles is described.
correlation coefficient for the singlet state. If Alice and Bob are satisfied that no eavesdropping has occurred, they use the second group of (oppositely correlated) measurement outcomes as the raw key.
The Ekert scheme solves the key distribution problem as well as the key storage problem, because there is no information in the singlets before Alice and Bob perform their measurements and communicate classically to establish the key. The scheme proposed here also involves entangled states, but the test for eavesdropping is different. Instead of a statistical test based on Bell's theorem, the test exploits conditional statements about measurement outcomes generated by pre-and post-selected quantum states.
The peculiar features of pre-and post-selected quantum ensembles were first pointed out by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz [3] . If (1) Alice prepares a system in a certain state |pre at time t 1 , (2) Bob measures some observable Q on the system at time t 2 , and (3) Alice measures an observable of which |post is an eigenstate at time t 3 , and post-selects for |post , then Alice can assign probabilities to the outcomes of Bob's Q-measurement at t 2 , conditional on the states |pre and |post at times t 1 and t 3 , respectively, as follows:
where P i is the projection operator onto the i'th eigenspace of Q. Notice that the ABL-rule is time-symmetric, in the sense that the states |pre and |post can be interchanged. If Q is unknown to Alice, she can use this 'ABL-rule' to assign probabilities to the outcomes of various hypothetical Q-measurements. The interesting peculiarity of the ABL-rule, by contrast with the usual Born rule for pre-selected states, is that it is possible-for an appropriate choice of observables Q, Q ′ , . . . , and states |pre and |post -to assign unit probability to the outcomes of a set of mutually noncommuting observables. That is, Alice can be in a position to assert a conjunction of conditional statements of the form: 'If Bob measured Q, then the outcome must have been q i , with certainty, and if Bob measured Q ′ , then the outcome must have been q ′ j , with certainty, . . . ,' where Q, Q ′ , . . . are mutually noncommuting observables.
A case of this sort has been discussed by Vaidman, Aharonov, and Albert [4] , where the outcome of a measurement of any of the three spin components σ x , σ y , σ z of a spin-1 2 particle can be inferred from an appropriate pre-and post-selection. Alice prepares the Bell state:
where | ↑ z and | ↓ z denote the σ z -eigenstates. Alice sends one of the particles-the channel particle, denoted by the subscript C-to Bob and keeps the ancilla, denoted by A. Bob measures either σ x , or σ x , or σ x on the channel particle and returns the channel particle to Alice. Alice then measures an observable R on the pair of particles, where R has the eigenstates:
Note that:
Alice can now assign values to the outcomes of Bob's spin measurements via the ABL-rule, whether Bob measured σ x , σ y , or σ z , based on the postselections |r 1 , |r 2 , |r 3 , or |r 4 , according to Table 1 (where 1 represents the outcome ↑ and 0 represents the outcome ↓):
This case can be exploited to enable Alice and Bob to share a private random key in the following way: Alice prepares a certain number of copies (depending on the length of the key and the level of privacy desired) of the Bell state: Table 1 : σ x , σ y , σ z measurement outcomes correlated with eigenvalues of R She sends the channel particles to Bob in sequence and keeps the ancillas. Bob measures σ x or σ z randomly on the channel particles and returns the particles, in sequence, to Alice. Alice then measures the observable R on the ancilla and channel pairs and divides the sequence into two subsequences: the subsequence S 14 for which she obtained the outcomes r 1 or r 4 , and the subsequence S 23 for which she obtained the outcomes r 2 or r 3 .
To check that the channel particles have not been monitored by Eve, Alice now publicly announces the indices of the subsequence S 23 . As is evident from Table 2 , for this subsequence she can make conditional statements of σ x σ z r 1 1 1 r 2 0 1 r 3 1 0 r 4 0 0 Table 2 : σ x , σ z measurement outcomes correlated with eigenvalues of R the form: 'For channel particle i, if σ x was measured, the outcome was 0 (1), and if σ z was measured, the outcome was 1 (0),' depending on whether the outcome of her R-measurement was r 2 or r 3 . She announces these statements publicly. If one of these statements, for some index i, does not agree with Bob's records, Eve must have monitored the i'th channel particle. (Of course, agreement does not entail that the particle was not monitored.)
For suppose Eve measures a different spin component observable than Bob on a channel particle and Alice subsequently obtains one of the eigenvalues r 2 or r 3 when she measures R. Bob's measurement outcome, either 1 or 0, will be compatible with just one of these eigenvalues, assuming no intervention by Eve. But after Eve's measurement, both of these eigenvalues will be possible outcomes of Alice's measurement. So Alice's retrodictions of Bob's measurement outcomes for the subsequence S 23 will not necessarily correspond to Bob's records. In fact, it is easy to see that if Eve measures σ x or σ z randomly on the channel particles, or if she measures a particular one of the observables σ x , σ y , or σ z on the channel particles (the same observable on each particle), the probability of detection in the subsequence S 23 is 3/8.
In the subsequence S 14 , the 1 and 0 outcomes of Bob's measurements correspond to the outcomes r 1 and r 4 of Alice's R-measurements. If, following their public communication about the subsequence S 23 , Alice and Bob agree that there has been no monitoring of the channel particles by Eve, they use the subsequence S 14 to define a shared raw key.
Note that even a single disagreement between Alice's retrodictions and Bob's records is sufficient to reveal that the channel particles have been monitored by Eve. This differs from the eavesdropping test in the Ekert protocol. Note also that Eve only has access to the channel particles, not the particle pairs. So no strategy is possible in which Eve replaces all the channel particles with her own particles and entangles the original channel particles, treated as a single system, with an ancilla by some unitary transformation, and then delays any measurements until after Alice and Bob have communicated publicly. There is no way that Eve can ensure agreement between Alice and Bob without having access to the particle pairs, or without information about Bob's measurements.
There are clearly other possible ways of exploiting this case to implement a secure key distribution protocol (involving all three spin component observables, for example), but the principle is the same. It would seem worthwhile to consider whether other applications of pre-and post-selection might be applied as a tool in quantum cryptology.
